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1. INTRODUCTION 
On 4 February 2016, the Trans-Pacific Parnership (TPP) agreement was signed between 12 
countries of the Pacific Rim (Rogowsky 2015). Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, 
Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States and Vietnam constitute 
the partnership that is supposed to be ratified by all signatories within two years. The 
immense scope of the agreement is manifested in three distinct ways: economically, 
substantively and politically. Economically, because it constitutes of nearly one-third of the 
world trade among 800 million people and 40% of global GDP (Rogowsky 2015; Bajekal 
2016). Substantively, because it covers a wide range of topics from intellectual property to 
market access and environmental issues (Rogowsky 2015: Furche 2013). And politically 
because the ‘[p]articipating countries show a high level of heterogeneity, both in terms of 
their income level, economic development indicators and forms of social and political 
organization.’ (Furche 2013: 9). This has both made it what President Obama named a 
‘twenty-first century trade deal’ because it sets the tone for the rest of the world due to its 
economic scope (Rogowsky 2015), but also an agreement with many concessions due to its 
substantive and political scope (Furche 2013; Schott et al. 2014). 
Among the signatory countries is Chile who, peculiarly, has bilateral trade agreements in 
effect with all other partners. Given the three-tiered scope of the agreement – all countries 
need to come to accord with one agreement on so many different levels affecting a lot of 
people – concessions need to be made in order for common ground to be found. Therefore, 
it raised questions on whether it was profitable to join, especially for Chile, since it has 
bilateral trade agreements with all participating countries (Furche 2013). This means that 
being part of the multilateral TPP agreement does not give access to new countries’ 
markets, but rather, access on new, not necessarily better, terms. In that light, the United 
States’ dominance in the agreement has been excessively reported on (Cheong 2013; Furche 
2013; Gordon 2012; Petri & Plummer 2016; Velk et al. 2015). Their dominance has been said 
to reflect itself in a way that the US can impose their preferences on the other countries 
(Gordon 2012). Next to that, it is also seen as a tool for US influence in the Pacific region, 
where China is a key player (Velk et al. 2015). Through this agreement the US is able to set 
standards in a region that is not naturally under their sphere of influence (Petri & Plummer 
2016). 
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In that sense, Chile’s role is also peculiar: historically they are linked to the US – most 
notably due to the US-backed coup of general Pinochet in 1973 (Harvey 2005: 7) – but 
currently Chile is linked more closely to China in terms of trade as it exports more to China 
and also imports more from China than it does from and to the US (Jenkins 2012). 
Therefore, it is interesting to see what Chile’s reasons for wanting to be part of an 
agreement that is dominated by the US, which seems to be decreasingly important to Chile, 
are. 
Therefore, I would like to dive into the incentives of Chile joining the TPP. Instead of looking 
at the specific content of the TPP for Chile, which has been done extensively (Capaldo et al. 
2016; Ffrench-Davis et al. 2015; Furche 2013), I would like to draw on their conclusions to 
find out how domestic affairs have influenced Chile during the TPP negotiations. The 
international affairs are often highlighted into why Chile would join a multilateral free trade 
agreement (FTA) – Chile wants to remain on good terms with the US for example (Furche 
2013; Jenkins 2012) – whilst the domestic affairs seem to be neglected in the process of 
coming to an agreement. Therefore, given the peculiarities of Chile’s involvement in the TPP 
– already having bilateral agreements with all signatory countries and aligning with the US in 
contrast to further cooperation with China – the following research question will be 
investigated in this thesis: 
How did domestic affairs influence Chile to sign the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement in 
February 2016? 
In order to answer this question, I will first give a literature review on what has been said on 
the TPP and Chile’s role in it. How I will do this will be explained in the methodology and 
theory sections. The analysis with results and discussions will subsequently be done to end 
with the conclusion and bibliography. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Chile and the TPP 
In this chapter, I will give a brief overview of the origins of the TPP, small states in 
international affairs and Chile’s role so far in the TPP and in recent historic international 
politics. 
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At Chile’s first attendance of a meeting of the leaders of the Asia Pacific Economic Forum 
(APEC) in 1994 in Bogor, Indonesia it was established that by 2010 there should be free 
trade and open investment in the region for the developed countries and in 2020 for the 
developing countries (Schott et al. 2014: preface). For all 21 leaders of the member 
countries of APEC this was a commitment easy to make since they would be long out of 
power by the time these targets should be met (ibid.). It was in 2006 when Brunei, Chile, 
Singapore and New Zealand kept the promise and signed the Transpacific Economic 
Partnership Agreement, known as the Pacific 4. This received little attention domestically 
and internationally since the agreement was mainly about trade – it reduced tariffs and 
taxes by 90% – and concerned relatively small countries population- and GDP-wise (Cheong 
2013; Furche 2013; Schott et al. 2014). This was an advantage as well as it would create a 
small barrier for other countries to join and eventually live up to the 1994 Bogor goals. It 
was, therefore, that in 2008 Australia, Peru, the US and Vietnam joined the Pacific 4, which 
agreed to change the title to the TPP to indicate the expanded membership (Cheong 2013). 
The global financial crisis, however, deterred negotiations until 2010 (Schott et al. 2014: 5). 
Under US President Obama negotiations reopened in March 2010. The accession of the 
United States significantly changed the scope of the agreement, because, as one of the 
leading countries in the world, higher interests are at stake (Cheong 2013; Furche 2013; 
Schott et al. 2014). Malaysia soon joined as well and in 2012 Canada and Mexico joined. 
When in 2013 Japan’s participation was approved the 12 members for the trade bloc were 
final. With Japan joining, the TPP became the biggest free trade agreement in history and 
the first one with two of the three largest economies in the world (Bajekal 2015). 
When it was signed in 2016 it consisted of two-fifths of the world economy and according to 
Schott et al. (2014: 3) it deserves particular attention on three points: 
‘First, the scope of the projected trade liberalization and new disciplines on policies 
that affect trade and investment of goods and services goes well beyond what has 
been achieved in other trade pacts (including those signed by the United States). […] 
Second, the TPP is perhaps the only FTA negotiation in which the number of 
participating countries has increased during the course of the talks. […] Third, the 
TPP is regarded as an interim arrangement or stepping stone toward a broader, 
regionwide Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP), possibly within a decade, as 
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envisaged by APEC leaders in Bogor in November 1994 and reaffirmed more recently 
by them in their meeting in Honolulu in November 2011.’ 
Schott et al. 2014: 3 
Telesur, a pan-Latin American TV channel, made the following figure picturing the scope of 
the agreement: 
 
Figure 2. The Trans-Pacific Partnership in Numbers (Telesur 2015)  
It is, thus, not only progressive and popular but is also said to incorporate new countries in 
the future. For Chile, this has been coherent with their personal objectives according to 
Fergusson & Vaughn (2011: 3) from the US Congressional Research Service: ‘Chile is a 
relatively isolated trade-dependent nation that is looking to Asia to expand its trade 
opportunities. Chile views the TPP as a way to help it navigate its course in an era of 
increased globalization and as an instrument for Chile to try to gain access to Asian markets 
and to ensure that it is not isolated outside international trading arrangements in Asia.’ The 
APEC forum has, in this sense, served as a useful platform as they signed FTAs with 13 APEC 
members, all of which are part of the TPP. Next to that, within three years they signed FTAs 
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with the European Union, the United States and China (2002, 2003 and 2005) followed and 
preceded by another 18 free trade agreements since 1996 (SICE OAS 2017).  
The pace at which Chile signed FTAs did not remain unnoticed globally as it became the first 
South American country entering the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) in May 2010 (Benediketer & Siepmann 2015: 9). According to Gian 
Luca Gardini and Peter Lambert (2011) this is due to Chile’s acceptance of globalisation, 
capitalisation on it and their pragmatic approach in foreign policy. ‘As a consequence, Chile 
nowadays is considered one of the most economically and financially liberal countries in the 
world. It is used as an example of the success of neoliberalism’ (Benedikter & Siepmann 
2015: 9). Next to opening up to the world, they are also increasingly investing more in the 
world. Although, still receiving more foreign direct investment (FDI) than sending FDI, their 
outward FDI has more than 30-folded since 2002 (KNOEMA 2017). Moreover, their share of 
the gross fixed capital formation has increased from a mere ten percent pre-2008 financial 
crisis to almost 30 percent in 2015 (UNCTAD 2016). This means that the investment in land 
improvements such as road construction or plant building in foreign countries has 
increased. This shows the growing involvement in global affairs, and the ease and speed 
with which agreements were signed and alliances formed showcases how pragmatic Chile’s 
foreign policy is. 
Soon thereafter, president Obama said: ‘Chile has become not only a leader in the 
hemisphere, but also a leader in the world.’ Although Obama is known for not always 
speaking his mind and diplomatically praising what he does not necessarily think, it remains 
a compliment and recognition for Chile’s efforts in promoting democracy and neoliberalism 
(Benedikter & Siepmann 2015: 196).  The success story has a flipside as well, however. 
Inequality in the country rose to the highest of all OECD countries and student protests 
ignited in 2011 causing nationwide protests in the next two years on all types of issues 
(Crandall 2014; Oyarzún 2013). These domestic troubles were in the midst of the TPP 
negotiations, which received more public attention as the years progressed. 
The attention was mainly negative as questions were being raised about the benefits for 
Chile in the agreement. The fact that Chile had already signed FTAs with all participating 
countries had raised concerns on whether or not it is profitable for Chile to be part of it. 
Carlos Furche, director of the General Directorate of International Economic Relations 
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(DIRECON) from the government of Chile from 2004 to 2010, among others, raised this 
issue: 
‘[T]he contents that are being incorporated in particularly sensitive areas, such as 
intellectual property and digital rights, services and investment, capital movements, 
environment, and regulatory coherence, among others, go far beyond what at the 
time was negotiated in those agreements. This would mean additional concessions 
to those already made as part of a negotiating balance that was once judged as well-
adjusted, and in those terms understood and approved by the national Chilean 
Congress. […] it is a negotiation in which the potential gains can only be minimal 
from a trading perspective. In contrast, some of the demands presented throughout 
the negotiation process might be very costly to Chile, as they may limit the 
development of public policies that are essential for the country’s development.’ 
Furche 2013: 3 
Other critics noted this as well. Ffrench-Davis et al. (2015) concluded that regulations to 
prevent financial crises were dismantled by the agreement through giving more power to 
big corporations. Capaldo et al. (2016) calculated that by 2025 exports from Chile would rise 
with 2,5%, but that this amount would be relative to zero when you put it in perspective of 
net export of GDP. In other words, the added value of the agreement in terms of exports 
would be close to zero. Next to that, ‘[f]ollowing the combined effect of small or negative 
changes in GDP and changes in the composition of output required by the need to introduce 
labor-saving technologies, we project employment losses in every TPP country.’ (ibid.: 18). 
The World Bank (2016) and Petri et al. (2012) argued in their studies that the net gains 
would be beneficial to all countries whilst also increasing labour opportunities. But, 
according to Capaldo et al. (2016), these calculations were made on assumptions that 
corporate profit would be immediately invested in productive activities and a workforce 
that is fully employed. These assumptions make it that these reports mark the TPP as 
beneficial to all countries. Herreros (2011) added to this that the lack of transparency with 
which the negotiations are being held raises concerns over what is exactly being negotiated. 
Apart from some leaks on chapters of intellectual property issued by Knowledge Ecology 
International (KEI) and WikiLeaks in 2013 and 2015, the negotiations were solely visible to 
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the negotiating parties’ ministries and stakeholders from the private sector who were 
invited per topic (Derechos Digitales 2016, tbm). 
On the other side, it cannot be neglected how important Asia is to Chile as a market of 
export and import. As mentioned earlier, it would consolidate relations with a region that is 
becoming increasingly important in the world and for Chile (Fergusson & Vaughn 2011). 
Despite China not being part of the agreement, the other Asian countries constitute a 
market that is attractive to Chile. Next to that, as a founding father of the Pacific 4, which 
evolved into the TPP, Chile is not in a sensible position to withdraw from the negotiations 
(Garcia et al. 2011: Furche 2013). It would send wrong signals to the other Latin American 
participating countries and would contradict their proactive stance in incorporating free 
trade deals. Ultimately, the biggest concession would be the distancing from the United 
States, Chile’s second biggest trading partner with which it has historically close relations 
(Furche 2013). 
I, therefore, want to look at how these concerns reached the international arena of the TPP 
negotiations. Chile is a relatively small country and it interests me to see how such a country 
can use a grand free trade agreement to its benefit. Accordingly, I will first review small 
states their role in grand free trade agreements to better understand Chile’s possible role in 
the TPP. 
2.2 Small states in grand free trade agreements 
Among the 12 participating countries of the TPP Chile is the fourth least populated country 
with 17.9 million inhabitants between Australia (23.9 million) and Singapore (5.5 million) 
whilst also having the fourth lowest gross domestic product (GDP) per capita with 13.416 
US$ between Brunei Darussalam (30.545 US$) and Malaysia (9.769 US$) (World Bank 2015). 
Although having the fifth lowest GDP with 240.796 million US$ between Singapore (292.739 
million US$) and Vietnam (193.599 million US$) they can be considered as one of the 
smaller states economically and population-wise in the TPP (World Bank 2015). Yet, this 
does not suffice in defining whether a state is small or great because it simply aligns states 
along a power spectrum based on numerical criteria. This way we are only able to define 
which state is greater or smaller, rather than presenting what defines great as great, or 
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small as small. To omit this, Tony Heron (2008) argues that states that depend majorly on 
exporting one or two commodities can be defined as small states: 
‘small states have a tendency to specialize in the export of one or two commodities, 
but this is often done on the basis of unilateral or bilateral trade concessions. In 
addition to this, because small states are rarely—if ever—the dominant producer of 
a given commodity, they are almost never in a position to determine international 
prices. The cumulative result of all of this is that small states are, as much as 
anything else, characterized by an acute sensitivity to external economic forces over 
which they have little, if any, control. Hence, in the final analysis, the defining 
feature of smallness from a political economy perspective is not so much a lack 
development opportunities, but rather a much higher than average dependency on, 
and vulnerability to changes in, the wider global political and economic 
environment.’ 
Heron 2008: 246-247 
 
Firstly, Chile is highly specialised in the export of copper and depends significantly on it 
(Ebert & La Menza 2015). According to data from the Observatory of Economic Complexity 
the amount of refined copper and copper ore exported in 2015 accounts for almost 50% of 
the value of their total export (OEC 2015). Next to that, 10% of the world’s copper reserve is 
in the hands of state-owned CODELCO which helped produce 23% of Chile’s fiscal revenue in 
2011 (Ebert & La Menza 2015). It is, thus, a crucial commodity for Chile’s well-being. 
Secondly, as an exporter, they rely greatly on the demand for copper which has boomed in 
the recent decade and a half. This is mainly attributed to China’s increase in import of raw 
materials due to the rise out of poverty of its population and the growing demand of their 
industrial sector (Gachúz 2012; Jenkins 2012). This shows Chiles dependency on copper and 
its prices, and reflects Tony Heron (2008) his point that Chile is not a small country solely 
based on GDP and population, but also because they are vulnerable to changes they have 
no control over. Therefore, I will dive deeper into why small states enter grand free trade 
agreements. 
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First, I will look at the success stories of small states in Europe and how they have become 
influential in global politics and the global economy. Then I will identify reasons for joining 
grand free trade agreements. Peter Katzenstein (1985) did research in Europe, looking at 
how small states like Belgium, The Netherlands or Austria were successful in participating in 
the global economy. His book, Small States in World Markets, aims to argue that small 
states in Europe were able to be economically successful due to their economic flexibility 
and political stability. This means that business, civil society groups and the state worked 
closely together in adjusting to economic changes. Next to that, the 1960’s and ‘70’s 
represented for most of these small European states a growth of a strong welfare system. 
This helped legitimise the state’s economic policy which therefore was trusted to change 
economic policy and was thus able to respond flexibly to external economic forces. Or as 
Niels Sidenius (1986: 87) in the Scandinavian Political Studies journal called the third 
response: ‘these countries – avoiding policies of protection as well as of structural 
transformation – combine international liberalisation with domestic compensation, the 
result of which is flexible policies of adjustment concerning industrial development.’ This 
response was highly effective in countering negative externalities by spreading the losses 
across the population, and served for many countries as an example. The successful 
collaboration and trust among the state, business and civil society groups are said to be 
important for the growth of a country and domestic compensation is deemed necessary for 
the harmful effects of international liberalisation (Katzenstein 1985; Sidenius 1986). These 
are relevant factors to see how Chile has dealt with them and how this has influenced the 
view on the TPP. 
In order to look at how small states can have influence in the global system Robert Keohane 
(1969) reviewed works by Robert Osgood, George Liska, Robert Rothstein and David Vital on 
small states, in an article he named Lilliputians’ Dilemmas: Small States in International 
Politics. He starts by trying to define what a small state is. A ‘systemic role’ countries can 
play, offered an effective distinction for analysis. This distinction is based upon the degree a 
state leader can influence a system. You have the ‘system-determining’ countries like the 
US, Russia and China; ‘system-influencing’ states like Germany for example who cannot 
individually dominate a discourse, but can significantly influence it; and, eventually, ‘system-
affecting’ states who can exert power only through cumulating powers of other small states 
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in regional organisations, aligning their goal to a greater power or focusing on a specific trait 
they have authority of (Keohane 1969: 295). Tom Long (2016) identified these tactics as: 
particular-intrinsic, derivative or collective. Particular-intrinsic is based on a certain resource 
or aspect of agreement in which the small state has leverage on. This could, for example, be 
Chile’s dominance in the copper industry, meaning they could use this position to influence 
other aspects of an agreement. With derivative, he means aligning with a greater power 
that seeks the same goals. And collective, is through seeking collaboration with multiple 
other small states by joining forces to gain what is collectively wanted. This systemic role-
approach is valuable in recognising incentives of small states in international relations. This 
can help us in identifying the distinct reasons for Chile to join the TPP. It should be noted 
that these tactics are ideal types and not mutually exclusive. It is certainly possible that a 
combination of tactics is used to pursue self-interest. 
As we saw in the first part of the literature review there seems to an abundance of literature 
on Chile’s international role in the TPP and how it positions itself in the global arena 
(Capaldo et al. 2016; Garcia et al. 2011; Fergusson & Vaughn 2011; Ffrench-Davis et al. 
2015; Furche 2013; Herreros 2011; Hsiang 2014; Robledo 2013). As it is a transnational 
agreement, naturally, one will look at the international effects of the harmonisation of these 
countries. Reasons for joining the TPP are sought in the international position a country 
aspires to be in, or the rapprochement of certain countries to one another. In other words, 
the incentives for joining are explained by international affairs. Instead, I want to look at the 
domestic affairs that have led to Chile joining the TPP. The international affairs of the TPP 
have been laid bare and indicated that as the originator of the agreement it does not make 
sense to leave, nor does the distancing from the US or the damage of not being part of it 
(Fergusson & Vaughn 2011; Furche 2013; Garcia et al. 2011). In that sense, I will not ignore 
the international affairs per se, but will rather direct my attention towards the domestic 
situation to understand how they ended up there. As the small states in Europe in the 20th 
century showed, in order to be successful, there needs to be close cooperation between 
civil society groups and the public and private sector (Katzenstein 1985). Much has been 
written on the effects the TPP will have once the agreement will go into force (Derechos 
Digitales 2011, 2016; Ffrench-Davis et al. 2015; Furche 2013; Lara & Ruiz 2016; Petri & 
Plummer 2016; Robledo 2013; Rogowsky 2015), but little research seems to be done on the 
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domestic incentives of Chile to join the agreement. Therefore, as the research question 
predicted, I will try to define the role different domestic actors have played and their 
relation to one another to see how this has influenced Chile to sign the TPP in 2016. How I 
will do this will be explained in the following methodology and theory chapter. 
3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Research design 
The aim is to identify why Chile joined the TPP by looking at how domestic affairs have 
played into this. I want to look at how the domestic status of Chile gave way to it joining this 
grand free trade agreement. As Chile joining the TPP is the outcome, this will constitute my 
dependent variable. The factors of this outcome will, in my research, be the domestic actors 
of Chile and will, thus, be my independent variable.  In that sense, I will conduct a case study 
of Chile. Yin (2013: 1) argues that: ‘In general, case studies are the preferred strategy when 
“how” or “why” questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over 
events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life 
context.’ As is the case in my thesis. 
For this case study, I will use a research design called process-tracing, ‘which attempts to 
trace the links between possible causes and observed outcomes. In process-tracing, the 
researcher examines histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, and other sources 
to see whether the causal process a theory hypothesizes or implies in a case is in fact 
evident in the sequence and values of the intervening variables in that case.’ (George & 
Bennett 2005: 6). It, thus, tends to want to define the causal mechanisms of an outcome. 
However, it is not in the interest of the researcher to own or direct one cause to a certain 
outcome. On the contrary, what Blatter & Haverland (2012: 80-81) call configurational 
thinking explains that ‘almost all social outcomes are the results of a combination of causal 
factors; there are divergent pathways to similar social outcomes (equifinality); and the 
effects of the same causal factor can be different in different contexts and combinations 
(causal heterogeneity).’ The process-tracing approach, thus, recognises that there are 
multiple causes for one outcome and takes advantage of ‘the fact that causality plays out in 
time and space.’ (Blatter & Haverland 2012: 81). With this we mean, that the process is 
decisive for the outcome and therefore every case is different for which the outcome is an 
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interplay of timely and location-specific causes. Or as George & Bennett (2005: 208) like to 
say: ‘two methods are not competitive’. In other words, referring to configurational thinking 
in process-tracing: 
‘[W]e will stress the importance of observations that allow for determining the 
temporal order by which the causal process unfolds (‘comprehensive storylines’), the 
empirical observations that provide certainty and density with respect to the 
pathway leading from cause to effect (‘smoking guns’), and empirical information 
that allows us to specify the underlying action-formation mechanisms that link 
causes and effects (‘confessions’). [..] they contribute to causal interference on the 
basis of temporal order, spatiotemporal density and analytic depth. On the basis of 
these kinds of ‘causal-process observations’, we draw conclusions on the status and 
role of causal conditions in the process of producing the outcome.’ 
Blatter & Haverland 2012: 81 
I will try to describe the processes that have led to Chile signing the TPP, which are unique 
and multiple, but in this I try to paint a logic picture for you to understand the outcome. 
Case studies and process-tracing are, thus, highly effective in identifying particular-intrinsic 
results. It is an in-depth elucidation of an object of interest in its own right, but one might 
question the generalisability of a case study (Bryman 2012: 69). If it is solely one case you 
research and adhere causality to, it appears that it could not be applicable to other cases. 
Flyvjberg (2006) contests this and the overall notion that in order to contribute to scientific 
knowledge it must be generalisable. First of all, to contest the latter, it is more effective to 
learn through examples than it is to learn from rule-based knowledge: ‘Common to all 
experts, however, is that they operate on the basis of intimate knowledge of several 
thousand concrete cases in their areas of expertise. Context-dependent knowledge and 
experience are at the very heart of expert activity. Such knowledge and expertise also lie at 
the center of the case study as a research and teaching method; or to put it more generally, 
still: as a method of learning.’ (Flyvjberg 2006: 5). Secondly, to contest the former, with 
process-tracing you are identifying the mechanisms that are at play in a certain situation. 
The mechanism you identified can then serve as a predictor for other situations (George & 
Bennett 2005: 218). In that sense, they are useful for falsifying theories. ‘Process-tracing in a 
single case can even exclude all explanations but one, if that explanation makes a process-
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tracing prediction that all other theories predict would be unlikely or even impossible.’ 
(ibid.: 220). Thus, the generalisable power of one in-depth case study can be much greater 
than general researches (Flyvjberg 2006). 
Next to that, the in-depth analysis of one certain case constrains the issue of spuriousness. 
Let me illustrate that with an example proposed by George & Bennett (2005: 206-207): if 
ten dominoes were aligned next to each other standing up in the first phase, and then in the 
next phase, you see domino one and domino ten fallen down but you cannot see dominoes 
two to nine. Dominoes two to nine are blocked from you view by a black box. It is very 
plausible that domino one fell down which caused the other dominoes, including domino 
ten, to fall down. However, domino one and then could also have fallen down individually 
without interfering with the other dominoes. This is called spuriousness: domino one and 
ten have fallen down but the cause could be multiple. With process-tracing you try to 
remove the black box by explaining extensively what happened to each domino individually 
and which eventually led to domino ten falling. You, thus, limit the issue of spuriousness by 
identifying the causal mechanisms. 
Process-tracing is, therefore, an ideal method to investigate the underlying mechanisms that 
have played into Chile signing the TPP. Through and in-depth analysis of important actors I 
will be able to identify the causes that led to Chile signing the TPP. 
3.2 Data collection and analysis 
As Chile was part of TPP’s predecessor the Pacific Four which went into force in 2006, my 
analysis naturally starts there and ends at the moment they signed the agreement in 2016. 
This does, however, not restrict me from looking beyond this timeframe. To understand the 
processes and developments that are at play in this timeframe, one must understand the 
history and complexity of Chile’s status. As will come forward during my analysis, a lot of 
legislation that was implemented during the dictatorial regime of Augusto Pinochet in the 
20th century is still in force today and, thus, has their consequences for Chile in the 21st 
century. Therefore, the analysis will have a much broader timeframe than the time period of 
the negotiations. The major events highlighted are however between 2006 and 2016 since 
these are the moments domestic affairs can influence Chile in the TPP, but naturally, these 
events can have its origins outside this timeframe. 
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Next to that, as proclaimed by George & Bennett (2005: 6) the documents used for analysis 
will range from academic literature, newspaper articles, interview transcripts, speeches, 
archival documents and other sources concerning the TPP and Chile. I will look for the 
affairs that have dominated the country during the negotiations. Actors are, naturally, 
important and incremental to the affairs played out, but affairs are broader in the sense 
that it can evaluate situations and trends. The actors play a role in the affairs, but 
throughout the analysis tendencies will become visible and clear. As some of these 
documents will be in Spanish, quotes will be translated for the readers. I have studied at the 
Pontificia Universidad Católica de Argetina in Buenos Aires where I was taught in Spanish 
and also received Spanish lessons, whilst previously having studied it at high school and 
doing courses at different teaching institutes in Amsterdam. For that, I hope to be trusted 
with the translations. It is noted behind the reference if it is translated by me with the 
letters tbm which stand for translated by me. 
4. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In order to analyse Chile’s ascension to the TPP the liberal theory in international relations 
offers an endogenous explanation for Chile’s behaviour. Andrew Moravcsik (2011) argues in 
The New Liberalism for the emphasis on domestic affairs that influence international 
behaviour. Thus, that the actions at the intergovernmental level are based on domestic 
preferences of the government. That the incentives of Chile joining the TPP are domestically 
founded, rather than internationally. Moravcsik argues the following: 
 
‘States act instrumentally in world politics to achieve particular goals on behalf of 
individuals, whose private behavior is unable to achieve such ends as efficiently. 
Internationally, the liberal state is a purposive actor, but domestically it is a 
representative institution constantly subject to capture and recapture, construction 
and reconstruction, by coalitions of social interests. It constitutes the critical 
“transmission belt” by which the preferences and social power of individuals and 
groups are translated into foreign policy.’ 
Moravcsik 2011: 4 
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It means that the reason for international influence in domestically desired. This is in sharp 
contrast with neorealist thinking which stresses the importance of international affairs 
(Söderbaum 2015: 38). Kenneth Waltz breaks down the essential elements of neorealism in 
his landmark book Theory of International Politics (1979) in which he states that, eventually, 
international relations are defined by interstate relations, not by outcomes of domestic 
affairs. He advocates that the position of states in the anarchy of international politics 
affects and dominates internal affairs. It ‘views states as unitary and rational egoists, and 
holds that structural features of the anarchical system make them predisposed towards 
competition and conflict.’ (Söderbaum 2015: 36). In other words, state behaviour can be 
trickled down to trying to maximise power vis à vis other states where international affairs 
prevail over domestic affairs. Liberalists argue that states are not in a constant competition 
for power, but that, rather, they are peace-seeking and status-quo oriented entities 
pursuing cooperation (Moravcsik 2011: 3). Herein, states serve as a political tool for 
individuals and groups with their own goals. It is, thus, bottom-up initiatives and incentives 
that drive international intentions. In this they take globalisation as a given status since 
states are in constant interaction with one another. In that sense, in contrast to popular 
belief, liberals do not neglect the possibility of war (ibid.: 2). Domestic preferences can 
converge or diverge internationally which could result in conflict. They do, however, stress 
the ability of cooperation amongst states, in which war is not a preferred outcome. Next to 
that, no preference is fixed. The only constant is change. The context is crucial in which 
preferences are declared. With the context constantly changing, no preference remains the 
same. It is, therefore, that states can ideologically differ over time. They are mere 
representatives of domestic demands. 
 
What liberals and neorealists do agree upon is the unforeseen outcomes of state behaviour. 
As Kenneth Waltz (2010: 65) famously said: ‘we would have to believe that no important 
causes intervene between the aims and actions of states and the results their actions 
produce. In the history of international relations, however, results achieved seldom 
correspond to the intentions of actors.’ He refutes the belief that outcomes of actions and 
policies are as predicted and as desired just as liberals do (Söderbaum 2015: 38). Thus, the 
liberal approach, to sum up, is focussed on domestic affairs driving international interests in 
which cooperation is sought and preferences are not fixed but constantly constructed 
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where world politics is under the universal condition of globalisation and outcomes are not 
necessarily as intended. According to Moravcsik (2011: 4) it is the task of liberals to derive 
state preferences from social preferences, which is something I intend to do. As there is 
often a focus on the big states in international affairs and how they influence global politics, 
it remains curious to look at how smaller states find their position in global affairs. Here lies, 
in my opinion, the gap in the literature. TPP talks have been dominated by debates over the 
great powers involved – the US creating a pivot in the Asia-Pacific – but the small states are 
playing a role as well. Whether this role is to contest or support the great powers’ course is 
as relevant as the course of the great power. According to Long (2016: 1-2) ‘[i]t is a good 
moment in history to be a small state. […] Legal norms of sovereign equality give small 
states a voice in many international organizations. An open global trading order has allowed 
many small states to specialize and prosper. Today, the threats to small states are fewer, 
and the number of small states has increased.’ Therefore, seeing international politics as an 
arena where states represent domestic preferences, I would like to analyse the incentives 
for Chile to sign the TPP. 
5. ANALYSIS 
My analysis will be divided into two parts which mainly reflect the public and private 
sectors’ influence on the TPP negotiations. Herein, the civil society groups play part in both 
sectors in order to safeguard the interplay of the three actors that were defined by 
Katzenstein (1985) as crucial to their development. The presidents are often mentioned as 
Chile is characterised as a presidentialist regime (Benedikter & Siepman 2015; Gardini & 
Lambert 2011; Oyarzún 2013). This means that ‘in practice, the majority of decisions are 
made by the executive.’ (Oyarzún 2013; 269). Results and discussions will appear 
throughout the analysis. The first part is divided into three parts which are part of the legacy 
that Augusto Pinochet’s regime left behind. This, as I will argue, still plays a major role in 
Chilean society and has its influence on policy today. The three different parts constitute the 
areas in which the TPP has influence and either continues or breaks down Pinochet’s legacy. 
The second part is Chile’s private sector which is divided into a part on Chile’s main industry, 
namely the copper industry, and the business groups that control much of Chile’s top 
corporate positions. These actors were able to influence the negotiations and thus formed a 
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crucial part in shaping Chile’s role. Together, I hope to have given a coherent display of the 
domestic affairs that have influenced Chile in signing the TPP in 2016. 
5.1 The Pinochet Legacies 
September 11, 1973 is known in history as the day socialist President of Chile Salvador 
Allende was overthrown by a US-backed military coup from Augusto Pinochet. His military 
coup caused the terror of everyone being associated with socialism or communism – from 
government officials and professors to farmers and union leaders – to be forced to go into 
exile or face death (Harvey 2005: 7). Chilean economists, trained in Chicago by the 
neoliberal theories of Milton Friedman were called upon to reconstruct the Chilean 
economy. ‘They reversed the nationalizations and privatized public assets, opened up 
natural resources (fisheries, timber, etc.) to private and unregulated exploitation (in many 
cases riding roughshod over the claims of indigenous inhabitants), privatized social security, 
and facilitated foreign direct investment and freer trade. The right of foreign companies to 
repatriate profits from their Chilean operations was guaranteed. Export-led growth was 
favoured over import substitution. The only sector reserved for the state was the key 
resource of copper.’ (ibid.: 8). A debt crisis in 1982 led to other institutional reforms in the 
field of education, taxes and electoral law (Barrett 1999). All these structural changes still 
remained in place long after Pinochet’s end of rule in 1990. I would like to argue that the 
legacies from Pinochet’s rule are a cause of much social unrest and inequality in Chile today, 
for which the TPP is, according to government’s belief, a remedy. 
Firstly, I will look at the demanded education reform by the student protests that paralysed 
Chile’s cities on several occasions (Crandall 2014). Secondly, I will briefly discuss the 
institutional electoral changes that were made and I will end with the issue over the tax 
reforms. 
5.1.1 Educational Reform 
In 2011 a student movement emerged, coined as ‘the most relevant social mobilisation to 
have emerged in Chile since the end of Pinochet’s dictatorship in 1990.’ (Bellei et al. 2014: 
426). Prior to this student movement, at the beginning of Michelle Bachelet’s first 
presidency in 2006, student protests emerged that took the country by surprise (Kubal et al. 
2016: 217). This was known as the ‘Penguin Revolution’ due to the students’ formal attire in 
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black and white, which made them appear like penguins. This protest ignited due to a new 
general education law which failed to adequately change the neoliberal choice system 
inherited from the Pinochet regime. Education reforms were demanded since they dated 
back to the 1981 educational reform under Pinochet. Before Pinochet’s reform the 
education system was completely in the hands of the state, but Pinochet decentralised it in 
neoliberal fashion (Kubal et al. 2016: 221). In the spirit of Milton Friedman’s proposals, 
education was to be denationalised in order for market competition to meet consumer 
demand. This was argued, by neoliberals, to be much more efficient than a public monopoly 
(Friedman 1962; Kubal et al. 2016). ‘Essentially, education would no longer be a state 
responsibility but rather a service available within an increasingly private market, paid by 
the direct beneficiaries: the students.’ (Kubal et al. 2016: 427). This led to a distinct growth 
of private and public institutions. Whilst the public institutions had to raise student fees and 
compete for governmental funding and subsidies, they remained the most prestigious and 
selective universities. The new private institutions, on the other side, capitalised on the 
growing middle class’ eagerness for post-secondary education. These became so successful, 
they accounted for 72% of tertiary education in 2012 (Bellei et al. 2014: 428). However, the 
protests in 2011 ignited again because the rise in demand for tertiary education could not 
be met. On the one hand, there were no new public institutions built since 1981 and, thus, 
they could not take on more students, whilst they were the institutions everyone wanted to 
go to, due to their prestigious academic record. On the other hand, the private institutions 
indebted students so much, it was no longer accessible for many with no security of a job in 
the future.  
Many scholars accredit the simmering discontent towards the education system to the 
troubled times it originates from and it ignited in 2011 due to the economic success the 
country was going through (Bellei et al. 2014; Benedikter & Siepman 2015; Kubal et al. 2016; 
Oyarzún 2013). The country was undergoing rapid economic growth as GDP three folded 
between 2003 and 2011 (World Bank 2017). This raised the demand for tertiary education, 
but also left many behind. Inequality had risen to the highest GINI coefficient of all OECD 
countries – 0.526 in 2011 – and research showed that 1% of the population earned more 
than 30% of the total income of the country, resulting in one of the most disparate of the 
world (Lopez et al. 2013; Oyarzún 2013). The country was economically prospering and 
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doing very well, but this was not felt by the population entirely. What, thus, started as 
student protests about education reform ‘soon overlapped with other, local-specific 
movements such as the strikes of mineworkers, women’s emancipation movements, 
indigenous and environmental movements, and eventually converted into a nationwide 
social protest initiative.’ (Benedikter & Siepmann 2014: 10). Bellei et al. (2014: 436) 
summarised it as follows: ‘it is clear that the combination of a country with rapid economic 
growth and increasing expectations, enormous social inequality, a precarious job market, 
and without the compensatory social policies of the welfare state, produces an environment 
of predictable social tension.’ This culmination of affairs resulted in national protests from 
2011 to 2013. 
This represents the time and situation Chile was in when it negotiated the first rounds of the 
TPP throughout my analysis. Due to the protests which took the country by storm, the 
negotiations received little attention. When it did, it was used in a way to calm the social 
unrest by saying it would bring jobs and create opportunities. Bruno Baranda, the 
Undersecretary for Labour Affairs, said it would set a standard for Chile’s troubled labour 
opportunities: ‘Labor regulations are a key aspect of negotiations and a seminar […] was 
held in parallel to the trade round for delegates to learn more about Chile’s labor market.’ 
(AmCham Chile 2011). Next to that, the TPP serves as an optimal tool to set labour 
standards across the Pacific which will improve the standards in Chile as well: 
‘Independently of the number of jobs created, the government’s goal is to advance towards 
an improvement in the quality of the country’s labor standards.’ said Baranda (AmCham 
Chile 2011). President at the time, Sebastian Piñera, confirmed this by saying that this 
agreement will remove the barrier of the Pacific Ocean between Asia and the Americas, and 
create opportunities for each other: ‘It is an open and vivid agreement that is going to 
grow.’ (El Mercurio 2012, tbm).  He stated that it would benefit Chile’s international agenda, 
increasing trade, which would benefit the Chilean public. 
Piñera, the first right-wing president since the return to democracy, was, however, not 
determined enough to push through educational reform that would put education back in 
the hands of the state during his term of presidency (2010-2014). When Michelle Bachelet 
came back to power in 2014 – she was the President earlier between 2006 and 2010 – she 
knew what she had to deal with first: ‘The only real enemy of Chile is inequality.’ She stated 
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acknowledging the root cause of the protests (Benedikter & Siepmann 2014: 81). When 
Bachelet visited the US in July 2014 she demonstrated her commitment to the TPP and the 
US by saying: ‘There is enough room for negotiations. All countries are looking for the 
highest standards. The US is looking for their interests in the negotiations, and so are the 
rest of the participating countries.’ (Emol 2014, tbm). She reassured the US’s commitment 
towards Chile, as it is Chile’s largest foreign investor, when she returned to the Chamber of 
Commerce in Chile: ‘The US is looking at us with continued enthusiasm and as a long-term 
ally.’ (ibid.) This support is necessary to tackle the inequalities in Chile, she continued: ‘For 
sustainable economic growth, we need to tackle inequality, starting with reforming the 
education system, to give a qualitive jump to the development of this country. This will 
gradually show its effects in the coming years.’ (ibid.). 
The education reform has, however, still not been pushed through. Protests arise every now 
and then with ones as recent as in May of this year (Telesur 2017). In 2015, she pushed 
through changes which made access to some universities free for the poorest docile of the 
population (Radwin 2016). However, these were not deemed sufficient for the students as it 
did not reform the education system completely. Bachelet said in her 2016 State of the 
Nation that ‘change is gradual’ and it is a ‘process’, but this did not please the students 
either as a month later, violent protests broke out again (Radwin 2016). The inequality 
prevalent in Chile gave rise to multiple protests throughout the years and made Chile more 
concerned about domestic than international issues. The TPP served, in this way, for both 
presidents as a tool for calming the people for which it can create jobs. The government 
believes it can bring the jobs necessary to tackle the soring inequality in Chile. Both 
presidents believed it will benefit the Chilean public and see it as a way to bring more 
opportunities to the country. 
5.1.2 Electoral Reform 
Sebastian Piñera became the president of Chile in 2010 and encountered a country that was 
the ‘most progressive, successful and fair economic environment of South America’ as 
proclaimed by Eliodoro Matte, an influential Chilean businessman (Benedikter & Siepmann 
2014: 9). Piñera had lost to Michelle Bachelet in the 2006 campaign for presidency, but was 
determined to win in 2010, as he continued campaigning in the years in between. His 52% 
victory was historical as he was the first right-wing politician to be democratically elected 
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since 1958 and also the first billionaire to become president of Chile (The Guardian 2010). 
He is one of the richest people in Chile and his presidency started off with a remarkable 
success, namely, the accession to the OECD in May 2010. The success continued when an 
apparent tragedy was averted. When in August 2010 33 miners were trapped in the 
Atacama Desert for 71 days, Piñera was faced with the challenge to lead this accident to a 
happy ending. Internationally, it got worldwide attention as it reached one billion views 
when the first miner safely exited the mine in October (Benedikter & Siepmann 2014: 37). 
Piñera was there to greet the miners and it put Chile in the middle of international attention 
for weeks which made him an extremely popular president nationally and internationally. 
This success seemed to have hung like the sword of Damocles as both the economic 
prosperity and popularity hit back through the student protests that arose in 2011. Next to 
that, the first concerns on the TPP were raised when the Knowledge Ecology International 
(KEI) leaked chapters on intellectual property which caused controversy in the digital world 
(KEI 2011). Carlos Lara and Claudio Ruiz (2014, tbm), professors at the University of Chile 
and part of Derechos Digitales, a Latin American organisation for the protection of Human 
Rights in the digital world, distinguished several points of impact the TPP would have on 
Human Rights. Concerning voting rights, the TPP would bypass special rights to indigenous 
people. Chile is home to many indigenous people, who, under special legislation need to be 
consulted upon when legislative or administrative changes could harm their interests. 
However, they are being neglected as a key component of Chilean society according to Lara 
& Ruiz (ibid.). This could be a huge issue when the implementation of TPP goes against the 
rights of indigenous people. This raises the issue of sovereignty and its democratic power. 
Namely, that the TPP would become a supra-national law that would transcend national law 
and thus neglect democratic outcomes. When implementing TPP, rights of people, and 
especially indigenous rights, would be violated (ibid.: 244). Furthermore, the chapter on 
electric commerce allows the cross-border traffic of data, including personal information, to 
other territories without regard to whether there is an adequate level of protection of 
individual rights in such territories (ibid.: 247). This means that information that is protected 
in a certain country, but if it is not protected in another country, it can be transferred freely 
without violating a law. This poses the question on sovereignty again, since domestic laws 
are bypassed by an international agreement without democratic consent. 
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At the time, there was already critique on another legacy of Pinochet’s regime. Namely, the 
leyes de amarre, or laws keeping things tied up that constitute a binominal electoral system 
(Benedikter & Siepmann 2014: 80). One part of these laws was the law that you had to 
register to be able to vote. Piñera was, however, able to promulgate a new law that 
registered Chileans to vote automatically when they turned 18. Another part of the leyes de 
amarre meant that every district can only elect two representatives for Congress. This 
practically meant that Congress consisted of two coalition parties taking all the seats (The 
Economist 2012). This resulted in a legislative duopoly and no fair representation of the 
smaller parties who are not able to finish in the top two positions. As former President 
Ricardo Lagos metaphorically stated: ‘When you vote in Chile you're offered red wine or 
white wine and that's it, there are no subtleties. You don't get to choose a cabernet 
sauvignon, a merlot or a sauvignon blanc.’ (ibid.). This led to favouring the status-quo and 
failing to represent the different preferences of Chilean society ‘to ensure that, as Pinochet 
allegedly put it in his last days in office, “democracy is not taken too far”.’ (Benedikter & 
Siepmann 2014: 80). 
Michelle Bachelet was, eventually, able to completely remove the law in 2015 giving smaller 
political parties a bigger chance to be elected for parliament (Gobierno de Chile 2015b). The 
changes by both Piñera and Bachelet thus made it easier for people to vote and making a 
vote for smaller parties more influential. Democracy was, thus, taken a bit further. However, 
as Carlos Lara and Claudio Ruiz (2014, tbm) stated it seemed that this move forward is taken 
away by the TPP. Bachelet said something about this earlier in her campaign when concerns 
were raised about the benefits for Chile: 
‘We are concerned about the urgency of negotiating the Transpacific Partnership 
(TPP). To ensure Chile's interest, a comprehensive review of its scope and 
implications must be made. For our country, it is a priority to prevent questionable 
aspects that may arise in this agreement, because, if poorly managed, it would 
become an indirect renegotiation of our FTA with the US. This would weaken already 
established agreements in the field of intellectual property, pharmaceuticals, public 
procurement, services and investments, or it would lead to the installation of new 
rules in the financial sector.’ 
Diario Financiero 2013, tbm 
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She acknowledged the dangers of the agreement but assured the people that she would not 
let the TPP infringe national laws or earlier negotiated FTAs. In 2016, Bachelet, however, 
signed it and as some of the heritage of Pinochet seemed to have been broken down by 
removing every aspect of the leyes de amarre and taking democracy further, the TPP seems 
to bypass the democratic outcomes. The TPP is, in this sense, making sure democracy is not 
taken too far. The domestic laws are thus able to be overruled by the transnational 
agreement which infringes Chile’s sovereignty (Lara & Ruiz 2014). The influence of civil 
society groups seems, thus, not to be strong enough, and the government looks like it does 
not want democracy to be taken too far. 
5.1.3 Tax Reform 
‘President Piñera has taken the bull by the horns, making modernization of the State one of 
the seven pillars of his platform to make Chile a developed country by the end of the 
decade.’ As quotes from the American Chamber of Commerce for Chile in 2012 state 
(AmCham Chile 2012). In this light, he has digitalised formal transactions like paying a fine, 
getting a birth-certificate or signing official documents with a digital signature (ibid.). The 
ambition of the TPP, to be an ‘agreement of the 21st century’ complies with the ambitions of 
modernising the Chilean state (Furche 2013). However, reforms to eliminate Pinochet’s 
legacies were under Piñera confined to enabling every adult to automatically be inscribed 
for voting, but removing another legacy of Pinochet’s regime, the favourable tax rates for 
corporations, remained untouched by Piñera. President Piñera, as a formal successful 
businessman, was a great supporter of the TPP. Director of DIRECON, the general 
directorate of international economic relations, Alvaro Jana stated that the TPP was 
extremely important to increase the amount of goods that are excluded from tariff rates in 
bilateral agreements and set standards in the protection of the environment (Pulso 2013, 
tbm). ‘Far from replacing Chile’s existing trade agreements, the TPP would “complement 
and complete” them, said Jana’ (AmCham Chile 2013). The gains from trade would be 
sufficient for which an increase in tax rates is not necessary. 
Michelle Bachelet thought otherwise and set in motion a bill where corporate tax rates are 
gradually increasing from 20% to 25% (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2014a). The added 
funds from the increase in taxes will then be relocated towards making the tertiary level 
education more accessible. ‘As the tax reform has been designed to fund an ambitious 
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education system overhaul designed to provide universal state-funded education until the 
tertiary level, critics of both bills argue that together they demonstrate an increasingly 
statist policy by the Bachelet government, which is at odds with Chile's investment-friendly 
reputation.’ (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2014b). Chile seems to be moving away from 
its past and become a more social country with Bachelet’s efforts of increasing taxes, 
making education more accessible and reforming much of what Pinochet had constituted. 
At the same time, the TPP is negotiating other terms. In March 2013, Rodrigo Contreras, the 
lead negotiator for Chile in TPP, resigned from his job, raising questions on his motives. Two 
months later he wrote an article in the Peruvian magazine Caretas explaining his 
resignation. Contreras, a well-respected trade negotiator and previously part of the Ministry 
of Economic Affairs in Chile between 2009 and 2012 said: 
‘The TPP is a great idea in the process of our development, but we must transform it 
into a realistic opportunity for our economies. We must reject the model based on 
the realities of high-income countries, which are very different from the other 
participating countries. Otherwise, this agreement will become a threat to our 
countries: it will restrict our development options in health and education, in 
biological and cultural diversity, and in the design of public policies and the 
transformation of our economies. This generates pressure from social movements 
that are increasingly becoming more active and are not willing to accept a 
government that simply accepts the results from the TPP negotiations which will 
limit the possibilities of increasing the prosperity and well-being of our countries.’ 
Contreras 2013, tbm 
One way to make it a realistic opportunity for Chile is to keep intact what is known as Chile’s 
encaje. The encaje is a rule set out by the Central Bank of Chile that requires foreign 
investors to deposit an amount of their investment into the Central Bank. This rule was 
fought over hard and long when Chile signed its FTAs with the US and Canada, but is being 
overruled by the TPP according to the leaked documents (Ffrench-Davis et al. 2015). The 
encaje is a way to control investment in- and outflows as it applied to Chilean outwards 
investment as well. As the Central Bank receives a portion of the investment, it raises the 
fiscal revenue of the country and, thus, serves one of the same purpose as a tax does. 
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However, it is now deferred and will no longer apply. This makes Chile more attractive to 
foreign investors, but there is less control over the actual benefits because there is no direct 
input towards the Central Bank. At the same time, outward investment is also no longer 
taxed, which means outward foreign investment is easier for Chileans (ibid.). This makes 
Chile more globally integrated but also gives you less control over your in- and outflows. 
For Francisco Garcés, director of international economy at Libertad y Desarrollo, a Chilean 
private investigation centre of public affairs, this would be a good thing and the government 
needs to be trusted with the negotiations as it still needs to be passed through Congress 
once it is signed. After all, ‘the negotiation information will flow through Congress, which is 
the designated democratic body – according to the country's institutions – to know the 
integrity of the information and then approve or reject it.’ (Libertad y Desarrollo 2013, tbm). 
He added that withdrawing from the negotiations would also be counterproductive as Chile 
would lose the ability to influence negotiations and fail to be part of an agreement with a 
region that is increasingly becoming more important to Chile in terms of exports (ibid.). 
Garcés believes that if the deal is negotiated well and the politics is able to reap the benefits 
from the agreement, it could distribute the gains and let Chile grow from this agreement 
(ibid.). 
The TPP is, in this sense, aiming for the same goal of raising fiscal revenue but it is doing it in 
a different way. The tax reforms implemented by Bachelet are still in force and have not 
been deteriorated by the TPP, but the removal of the encaje gives her less control over the 
in- and outflow of investments. As there is no control, only the future can tell if this will 
bring benefit to the country. 
As the different legacies of Pinochet are still at play, they leave their mark on how the TPP is 
perceived. The inequality has made the TPP a way for the presidents to calm the people and 
say it will bring prosperity. At the same time, indigenous people are being neglected and the 
raising of fiscal revenue diverted. There is little direct influence, but rather indirect through 
making the TPP an important agreement for the benefit of the people. 
5.2 Private Sector 
Here I will do my analysis of the influence the biggest industry of Chile – copper – had on the 
TPP negotiations. Also, ‘[a]s a result of the intertwinement between economics, free-market 
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ethics, politics, and the heritage of the (to some extent elitist and for a long time 
authoritarian) cultural and social history, power and wealth in Chile remain closely 
interrelated. They are dominated by less than a dozen families such as the Mattes and 
Paulmanns, their business partners, dependents, and allies, both domestic and 
international.’ (Benedikter & Siepman 2014: 20). The role of these business groups needs, 
thus, to be discussed in order to look at their influence in the negotiations of the TPP. 
5.2.1 Copper industry 
Copper is the main product of export, accounting for half of its exported value (Ebert & La 
Menza 2015; OEC 2015). Chile is the largest producer of copper in the world and derived 
23% of fiscal revenue in 2011 ‘from royalties, taxes on profits of private mining companies 
and profits from Codelco.’ (Ebert & La Menza 2015: 106). This commodity is, thus, very 
important to Chile and in Asia they have found a region it can send its commodity to (De 
Gregorio & Labbé 2011; Orihuela 2012). The rapid integration of Asia into the global 
economy has come with a need for raw materials Chile can provide (Dingemans 2014; 
Jenkins 2010). Chile signed FTAs with the largest economies in the world since the turn of 
the century, whilst a copper pricing boom served Chile in both its insertion into the global 
market economy as well as its rapid growth of GDP and GDP per capita (Ebert & La Menza 
2015: 103; Rehner et al. 2014). As mentioned earlier the neoliberal component has 
remained the key characteristic of Chile’s economy, exemplifying Pinochet’s legacy, which 
has not been severely changed. Dingemans (2014: 80) sums it up as follows: ‘Since the early 
1980s, successive governments have been managing Chile’s economy rather than steering it 
in a particular direction, under the assumption that market forces by themselves would give 
it the right direction. However, in spite of having achieved a relatively high level of income, 
Chile’s current production structure is qualitatively similar to the one it had decades ago.’ 
The TPP can, in that sense, be seen as a solidification of this trend and a further dependency 
on copper. 
These trade policies have made Chile the economically prosperous country it is today but 
have also led to what is commonly referred to as the ‘natural resource curse’ (Ebert & La 
Menza 2015; Rehner et al. 2014). ‘The concept of the “natural resource curse” (also known 
as the “resource trap”) addresses the dependence of developing countries on their natural 
resources and the relationship between exports of those resources and economic growth.’ 
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(Rehner et al. 2014: 36). The negative implication of the terms ‘curse’ and ‘trap’ stem from 
the belief that prices for raw materials decline in relation to manufactured goods, known as 
the Prebisch-Singer thesis, which, thus, makes Chile’s export dependent on a commodity 
with decreasing value (ibid.). Next to that, the high volatility of commodity prices makes 
Chile’s export market exposed to fluctuations in global prices (ibid.). Given Chile’s large 
involvement in the copper industry, it also makes Chile’s other exports affected by the price 
of copper what is known as the ‘Dutch Disease’ (Ebert & La Menza 2015; Rehner et al. 
2014). This means, ‘[f]or example, when international copper prices are high, an increasing 
inflow of US dollars is derived from copper exports, generating increased offers of US dollars 
and reducing the dollar’s price in relation to Chile’s local currency. However, the decreased 
value of the US dollar has a negative effect on the export activities of other sectors, e.g., 
agriculture, because it makes national exports more expensive on international markets.’ 
(Rehner et al. 2014: 36). The engagement in the copper industry, thus, seems to reinforce 
itself by devaluing other commodities over the success of the copper prices. 
Chile is therefore a trade-dependent country deriving much of its benefits from trade. 
Although ‘the global copper prices have experienced a considerable and sustained increase 
since 2003’ (Rehner et al. 2014: 39), thus avoiding the negative externalities of the recourse 
trap, the predictions remain that this growth is not sustained in the long term (Giljum 2004; 
Rehner et al. 2014). Firstly, because it is mostly invested in copper and copper byproducts 
which consequently employ elementary occupations (Ebert & La Menza 2015: 105). 
Elementary labour refers to the lowest skill level of labour and entails mainly physical labour 
with hand held tools. Chile exhibits the highest percentage of elementary occupation in 
Latin America apart from Peru (ibid.) This is consistent with the resource trap when your 
economy is dominated by one commodity. Secondly, both the negative environmental 
impact of the copper industry – disposal of waste and emissions – and the fact that copper 
is a non-renewable commodity clearly indicates that this path is unsustainable in the long 
term (Giljum 2004: 257). For these reasons, it seems that the copper industry is a secure 
investment for the short term, but, both due to the low-skilled jobs in the industry paying 
low wages and the unsustainability of the industry, it should seek to tap into other 
industries for the future generations. 
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In this sense, the TPP could serve as a tool to enter higher value industries in order to 
mitigate the negativities of the copper industry and become part of a more sustainable 
industry. It is a way to enter higher stages in the global value chains (GVCs). In 2015 
DIRECON requested the OECD to investigate Chile’s position in the GVCs and came to the 
following conclusion: ‘The results of the study show that Chile is indeed highly engaged in 
GVCs, but primarily as a producer of inputs that other economies use in their production, 
which is mainly attributable to the high importance of copper and other natural resources in 
Chile´s exports. In addition, the role of research and development (R&D) and innovation 
more broadly is limited in the economy, and the country continues to specialize in the basic 
commodities and relatively unsophisticated mining-related products.’ (OECD 2015). 
According to Andrés Velasco, former minister of finance under Bachelet’s first term, it is 
‘[p]recisely because of the urgent need to diversify their exports, Chile, Peru, and other 
middle-income countries could benefit tremendously from agreements like the TPP.’ 
(Velasco 2015). He explains: ‘Today commodity prices are down, and so is growth. Because 
it is difficult to become ever more efficient at producing a ton of copper or a pound of fruit 
(and, in Chile’s case, the grade of copper ore is fast declining), further growth has to come 
from diversification: moving capital and labor to new sectors, where productivity is higher.’ 
(ibid.). the TPP countries can, thus, serve as a market for Chile to diversify its exports and 
create a Pacific-wide value chain. 
The dangers of remaining dependent on the copper industry for the future have been made 
clear and, although, Chile thanks its prosperous position today to the copper industry, there 
seems to be scholarly consensus that this will not remain the case for the future. Therefore, 
the TPP could serve Chile’s interest of deepening its relationship with a region it knows well 
already. Becoming part of higher value chains is attainable as Velasco (2015) explained and 
explains why Chile has remained part of this agreement. 
5.2.2 Business Groups 
‘Business groups – sets of corporations from diverse sectors bounded together in formal and 
informal ways by a common investor – have historically dominated Latin American 
economies. Included among these are the […] Luksic and Falabella in Chile.’ (Cardenas 2015: 
430). Julián Cardenas (2015) researched whether there was transnational cohesiveness 
among the corporate elites in Latin America and found out that this was not substantially 
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the case. However, it did recognise the importance of business groups on the national level. 
When, for example, ‘members of the same family sit on the boards of directors of several 
companies, it creates a relationship between these corporations because family members 
share dinner tables, informal meetings and barbecues on Sundays.’ (Cardenas 2015: 439). As 
they are more focused on the national market, close ties with political elites are often 
present (Khanna & Yafeh 2007). This results in like-minded lobby groups who have great 
influential power (Oyarzún 2013). The public-private divide is, thus, relatively small as 
functionaries often have or have played a role in both sectors, or know someone close to 
them that does (Bull 2008). This group of technocrats, as Bull (2008) calls them, moves back 
and forth between private institutions and public positions where they participate directly in 
trade negotiations. 
The interest for the Asia-Pacific emerged in the early 2000s when large domestic groups in 
the forestry, mining and banking business sought closer relations with the Asia-Pacific and 
other exporters, like fisheries, fruits and wines looked for new markets on the other side of 
the Pacific (Bull 2008). This resulted in the many FTAs signed in the last two decades with 
that region. The absence of other stakeholders was said to be efficient towards signing the 
agreements: ‘Governmental representatives admitted that consultations with labour 
unions, micro industries and NGOs, with a few important exceptions, were less useful than 
those undertaken with business since these groups often used them to express general 
complaints that were not directly related to the trade agreements and contributed little to 
the formulation of national positions.’ (Bull 2008: 223). This was also the case during the 
TPP negotiations as NGOs or labour unions were not involved in the negotiation talks 
(Schott et al. 2014). Barbara Stallings aptly describes how the many FTAs were signed which 
bare great resemblance with what I have discovered about the TPP: 
 
 ‘The FTA process has mirrored Chile’s strong presidential system. All FTA initiatives 
have come from the executive branch. […] Relations between the trade apparatus 
and the business sector are multifaceted. A private-sector consultation committee is 
the formal venue for exchange of information and opinion. More important are 
informal links, especially between DIRECON and the main business associations. [..] 
An institution known as the “room next door” was instituted for recent negotiations, 
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meaning that business representatives accompany the negotiators to be kept 
informed and discuss technical matters. Labor and civil society incorporation has 
been far less extensive. Overall, a clear pattern has characterized Chilean trade 
policy—the executive branch takes the initiative and sets the main policies; and the 
business sector gets involved over details that involve particular sectors and may 
lobby for small adjustments that will help their members.’ 
Stallings 2009: 126 
Bachelet made use of ‘the room next door’ in her first term and did so in her second as well 
(Paley 2015). This ignited some hope for negotiations to become more part of the public 
debate but she only invited representatives from the private sector to shed their light on the 
negotiations whilst there was no progress in making the documents available for the public, 
nor were any members of civil society groups invited (ibid.). It, thus, looks like the domestic 
influence remained restricted to business groups and the government like the many FTAs 
signed in the 2000s. 
However, at the same time, resistance of the groups or the people that lose from 
international trade – small and medium-sized enterprises, for example, that are not able to 
compete against international corporations – are effectively opposed by the government. 
Wehner (2011: 218) identified three ways of how the government ‘reduced the early 
opposition of protective-oriented sectors to FTAs by 1) setting them on the path to being 
phased out in the long term, 2) giving them compensation packages and 3) implementing 
reconversion programmes to make them more competitive.’  Phasing out means to 
liberalise a certain market in phases that can take 10 to 20 years to be completed. Like this, 
the effects are always minimal and the change gradual which makes the market able to 
adjust accordingly. These policies have dampened the negative effects for certain sectors 
opening up to international trade during the 20 years of the centre-left coalition (ibid.). 
There have been more attempts to get more certainty about the benefits of the TPP. In 
March 2015, there was a special hearing organised about the implications of the TPP in the 
Chamber of Deputies. Several members expressed their concerns over the secrecy of the 
negotiations and the amplitude of sectors it will cover (Gainza 2015, tbm). Four young 
members of the Chamber of Deputies wore special white sweaters with the text ‘#NoTPP’ 
on it. These four members were also protagonists during the students protests as leaders of 
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different student organisations. They demanded more insight into the negotiations because 
the people deserve to know what is negotiated and why certain choices are made (ibid.). A 
resolution went to a vote in May 2015 where was asked that prior to the decision of signing 
the TPP the President has to publicly accredit the TPP that it will bring economic benefits to 
the country. The resolution was rejected as more members voted against than in favour 
(Camara de Diputados 2015, tbm). Another and the last sign of objection was during the 
signing of the agreement when the streets of Santiago were filled with protestors against 
the TPP (Telesur 2016). A special focus was directed to big international corporations 
allegedly using this agreement to favour their own interest, putting profit above people. 
Heraldo Muñoz, Minister of Foreign Affairs, said in defence of the TPP that it is beneficial 
and consistent with Chile’s trade policies. He added that during the five-year negotiation 
process much of what was contested over has been removed and the bill still, naturally, has 
to pass through Congress before it will go into force (ibid.). 
 
Figure 3. Demonstrators protest against the Trans-Pacific Partnership in front of the government 
house in Santiago, Chile, Feb. 4, 2016. | Photo: Reuters (Telesur 2016) 
It seems that the business groups were, thus, able to influence the negotiations due to their 
access to the ‘room next door’ as well as the close ties they have with the trade negotiators. 
Civil society groups and some members of the government tried to get more access to the 
documents but this was abstained by the government itself. The government and business 
representatives were thus able to shape the agreement to their liking directly. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
6.1 Summary and results 
In this part I will briefly review what is said and try to link all the parts together in order to 
give a sensible answer to the research question. From the peculiarity of Chile being part of 
the TPP, as the single country with FTAs intact with all participating countries, and the 
grandeur of the economic, political and substantive scope of the TPP, stemmed my interest 
of diving further into the relationship between these two entities. The international reasons 
and the US dominance became clear quite soon and led me to become more intrigued by 
Chile’s role as they look for further integration with the Asian market without antagonising 
its traditional investor and ‘long-term ally’ (Emol 2014, tbm). This answer was, however, not 
sufficient enough for me to fully understand Chile’s incentives of joining. Moravcsik’s (2011) 
rationale clarified the way for me to be able to understand Chile’s incentives. When looking 
at the domestic affairs, it can be understood how a state acts internationally. In this, the 
strong cooperation between different domestic entities is crucial for the success of small 
states according to Katzenstein (1985). With the case study of Chile, I was able to unravel 
this through process-tracing by erasing the black box between the accession to the Pacific 4 
and the eventual signing of the TPP. The legacies of Pinochet’s regime and the neoliberal 
path it sent Chile on remained present and coherent with some of the governments’ goals, 
whilst also proving to be detrimental to social equality and societal composure. The TPP 
was, in that sense, sometimes a way to upset society or bypass social policy and in other 
ways to calm society and bring prosperity. Eventually the seats at the negotiation tables 
were, for Chile, filled by business representatives and government trade negotiators, whom 
have close relations with one another. Among them, there seemed to be an overall 
consensus of the benefits of the TPP for both solidifying its current relations and the 
possibility for the aspired entry into higher value industries. Hereunder, I will try to link it 
together to derive insights of the interplay of sectors to be apparent. 
What Katzenstein (1985) identified to be important for states to become successful in the 
global economy seems to be missing in Chile at times. The effectiveness of certain 
institutions failed because it did not deliver on what it intended. Tertiary education was left 
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to the private sector, but the visible discontent of the public displayed its ineffectiveness to 
deliver quality and accessible tertiary education. The disparate growth of the public and 
private institutions constitutes a lack of cooperation between the two entities to fulfil its 
duty of educating the public. Next to that, the further democratising of elections goes 
against the overruling of certain laws from the TPP. The negotiators seem thus to be at odds 
with governmental goals. Whilst the tax reform aims to increase fiscal revenue, the 
removing of the encaje seems to decrease it again, when the purpose of the additional fiscal 
revenue was promised for the educational reform. The TPP seems thus to dismantle some 
governmental objectives. The international liberalisation is, thus, not met with the domestic 
compensation as proposed by Katzenstein (1985) to be crucial for equal growth.  
The cooperation between the public and private sector seems, thus, not to be optimal for 
the public. This trend looks to be visible as well for the role of civil society groups during the 
negotiations of the TPP, as we have seen with the absence of civil society groups in ‘the 
room next door’. The dominance of business groups and their close ties to all powerful 
entities of society seem to be able to keep labour unions and NGOs outside of this room. In 
the negotiations, the business groups seem to have opted for a derivative role by following 
the system-determining countries like the US and Japan in the agreement (Keohane 1969; 
Long 2016). As they have to merely represent the business groups, since the civil society 
groups are being neglected in the negotiations, they can freely align with bigger 
corporations internationally. The TPP serves, in this way, the domestic powerful groups that 
want to solidify relations. Solidifying the copper industry, but avoiding the resource trap and 
Dutch disease through entering higher value chains. This is believed to be accomplished by 
the TPP. As the business groups, together with the government and their overlapping 
relations they are the ones directly influencing the TPP negotiations for Chile. 
Indirectly, they are accountable towards the public. In this sense, the TPP served as a way to 
tackle the inequality. Government and business agreed that the TPP could deliver on this, 
but how this would be done, showed disparate answers. The business groups believe in the 
market powers to bring prosperity due to the diversification of trade enabled by the TPP. 
Michelle Bachelet believes the TPP will bring prosperity, but not equally, and, thus, wants to 
implement social policies for the benefits to even the gains out. No matter which way you 
believe this will be accomplished, for both, the TPP represented a way to tackle the 
38 
 
inequality. Thus, for the purpose of my thesis, the inequality had an influence on signing the 
agreement as it was used for both parties in a way to justify signing the TPP. 
To erase the black box between Chile’s membership of the Pacific 4 and the signing of the 
TPP, there have been multiple domestic forces pushing it that way. The business groups and 
copper industry wanted to strengthen their ties internationally and saw it as a way to attain 
new markets and enter higher value chains. The governments of Bachelet want it to bring 
more prosperity to the country which it can then divide to restore some equality. The TPP 
served in that sense as a way to tackle the prevailing inequality. Whilst the electoral and tax 
reforms seemed to be pushed back by the TPP, they were possibly allowed due to the 
acceptance of the TPP. This also showcased the power of the ruling parties as the 
indigenous groups did not have a say in the negotiations. Research showed the little 
advantage the Chilean workforce would receive from the TPP (Capaldo et al. 2016; Ffrench-
Davis et al. 2015; Herreros 2011), and the protests from civil society groups and the public 
were apparent (Derechos Digitales 2016; Telesur 2017). It was signed however, showing 
that the advocates of the agreement still have the power in this country. The business 
groups tend to want to keep pushing the neoliberal agenda, whilst the government is still 
dealing with the constitutional legacies Pinochet has left behind. Thus, to answer the 
question posed in the title, it seems like the TPP is seen as a remedy for Chile’s current 
status, whilst it fulfils the destiny of Pinochet’s legacies. 
6.2 Broader implications 
As identified earlier in the conclusion and analysis, for the successful emergence of small 
states in the global economy there needs to be strong cooperation between the different 
sectors of society. Katzenstein (1985) identified these for the smaller markets in Europe, 
who due to their economic success and strong social policies were able to grow 
internationally, but also make the entire population profit from it. As we have seen with 
Chile, it was already inserted into the global economy to a remarkable extent. However, the 
inequality the country dealt with means to say that it failed where the small states in Europe 
succeeded. Thus, if both cases are true, then the issue of Chile is the lack of cooperation 
between the public and private sector and the civil society groups, together with an 
inadequate social system. My analysis, shows just this, in my opinion. Thus, for the broader 
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implications of the study of international relations, it is interesting to see that where a 
country fails to cooperate between its different domestic sectors and fails to complement 
international liberalisation with strong social policies, it will not prosper evenly for its entire 
population. Thus, verifying Katzenstein (1985) his theory. 
Next to that, I believe to have shown that looking at Chile’s domestic affairs, benefits when 
one wants to understand its international stance. It, thus, pays of looking at the domestic 
affairs of a country to understand how it behaves internationally. As Moravcsik (2011) 
proclaimed, I believe to have adhered to his theoretical underpinnings. Although, I briefly 
mentioned the derivative role Chile seems to have played in the TPP, in order to understand 
why it plays this derivative role, it is beneficial to look at the domestic affairs that constitute 
this role. A teacher during this year’s Master once said that states behave like humans. They 
behave in a certain way because they are in a certain situation with a certain past and a 
certain current status. To understand how they behave among each other, you must 
understand the individuals’ personal objectives and statuses. For the purpose of my thesis, 
this was highly effective, since I looked at how domestic affairs influences international 
affairs. But I would argue that even when you research an international phenomenon, like 
the TPP, it benefits looking at the domestic issues of each country to understand the 
outcome. Thus, when studying international affairs, I argue, it is crucial to look at the 
domestic status of each actor in the international arena. The broader implication for the 
study of international relations is, thus, to look more at each countries’ status in order to 
understand its opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40 
 
7. BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
AmCham Chile (2011, March) Trans-Pacific Trade Talks Advance. Retrieved from < 
<http://www.amchamchile.cl/en/2011/03/el-avance-de-las-negociaciones-del-acuerdo-
trans-pacifico/> 
AmCham Chile (2012, December) A Better State For Chile. Retrieved from 
<http://www.amchamchile.cl/en/2012/12/un-mejor-estado-para-chile/> 
AmCham Chile (2013, April) Partners across the Pacific. Retrieved from 
<http://www.amchamchile.cl/en/2013/04/socios-a-traves-del-pacifico/> 
Bajekal, N. (2015). What will the Trans-Pacific Partnership do? Time, 186(15/16), 14. 
Barrett, P. S. (1999). The limits of democracy: Socio-political compromise and regime change 
in post-Pinochet Chile. Studies in Comparative International Development (SCID), 34(3), 3--
36. 
BBC (2010, October) Profile: Chile’s President Sebastian Pinera. Retrieved from 
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-11558721> 
Bellei, C., Cabalín, C., & Orellana, V. (2014). The 2011 Chilean student movement against 
neoliberal educational policies. Studies in Higher Education, 39(3), 426-440. 
Benedikter, R., K. Siepmann (2015). Chile in Transition. Cham: Springer International 
Publishing. 
Blatter, J., & Haverland, M. (2012). Designing case studies: Explanatory approaches in small-
N research. Palgrave Macmillan. 
Bryman, A. (2012). Social research methods (4th ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Bunker, K. (2014). The 2013 presidential and legislative elections in Chile. Electoral Studies, 
34, 346-348. 
Camara de Diputados (2015, May) Proyecto de Resolución N. 366. Retrieved from 
<https://www.camara.cl/trabajamos/sala_votacion_detalle.aspx?prmID=21054> 
Capaldo, J., Izurieta, A., & Sundaram, J. K. (2016). Trading down: Unemployment, inequality 
and other risks of the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement (No. 16-01). GDAE, Tufts 
University. 
Cheong, I. (2013). Negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement: Evaluation and 
Implications for East Asian Regionalism. ADBI Working Paper 428. Tokyo: Asian 
Development Bank Institute. 
Christian, Shirley. (1988, March 28). Chile's growing trans-Pacific ties. The New York Times, 
p. 27. 
41 
 
Crandall, B. (2014). Chile Can Say No. Survival, 56(2), 199-204. 
CEHURD (2012, February) Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement. Retrieved from 
<https://cehurd.org/2012/02/trans-pacific-partnership-agreement/> 
Contreras (2013, May) Nuevo Tablero Mundial. Retrieved from 
<http://www2.caretas.pe/Main.asp?T=3082&id=12&idE=1101&idSTo=255&idA=63728#.WS
2U42iGO00> 
Derechos Digitales (2011, October) #NOTPP: negociando en secreto y a ciegas 
<https://www.derechosdigitales.org/3243/notpp-negociando-en-secreto-y-a-ciegas/> 
Derechos Digitales (2016, February) TPP: La lucha recien comienza. Retrieved from 
<https://www.derechosdigitales.org/9709/tpp-la-lucha-recien-comienza/> 
De Gregorio, J., & Labbé, F. (2011). Copper, the Real Exchange Rate and Macroeconimic 
Fluctuations in Chile. Central Bank of Chile. 
Diario Financiero (2013, October) “Se habla de costos y perjuicios del TPP, pero el mayor 
costo para Chile es no ser parte” Retrieved from <https://www.df.cl/-se-habla-de-costos-y-
perjuicios-del-tpp-pero-el-mayor-costo-para-chile-es-no-ser-parte/prontus_df/2013-10-
07/212831.html> 
Emol (2014, June) Bachelet en EE.UU: Conozca todos los detalles de la visita de la Presidenta 
a Barack Obama <http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/2014/06/28/667436/bachelet-
en-eeuu-conozca-todos-los-detalles-de-la-visita-de-la-presidenta-a-barack-obama.html> 
El Mercurio (2012, December) Chile y el TPP. Retrieved from 
<http://www.elmercurio.com/blogs/2012/12/06/7210/chile_y_el_tpp.aspx> 
Fergusson, I. F., & Vaughn, B. (2011). The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement. LIBRARY OF 
CONGRESS WASHINGTON DC CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE. 
Ffrench‐Davis, R., Gallagher, K. P., Lim, M. H., & Soverel, K. (2015). Financial Stability and the 
Trans‐Pacific Partnership: Lessons from Chile and Malaysia. Global Policy, 6(4), 330-342. 
Friedman, M. (1962). Capitalism and freedom. University of Chicago. 
Furche, C. (2013). Chile and the TPP negotiations: Analysis of the economic and political 
impact. ONG Derechos Digitales 
Gachúz, J. C. (2012). Chile’s Economic and Political Relationship with China. Journal of 
Current Chinese Affairs, 41(1), 133-154. 
Gainza, C. (2015, May) No al TPP: Sesión especial en la cámara de diputados de Chile 
#NoTPP. Retrieved from 
<http://manzanamecanica.org/2015/05/no_al_tpp_sesion_especial_en_la_camara_de_dip
utados_de_chile_notpp.html> 
42 
 
Garay, V. (2014) ¿Se atreverá Chile a decir que no? Retrieved from 
<https://www.derechosdigitales.org/7595/tpp-se-atrevera-chile-decir-que/> 
García, J., López, D., Bueno, R., & Muñoz, F. (2011). Documento 3: Aspectos económicos y 
comerciales. 
Gardini, G., & Lambert, P. (2011). Latin American foreign policies : Between ideology and 
pragmatism. New York, NY [etc.]: Palgrave Macmillan. 
George, A. & Bennett, A. (2005) Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. 
Cambridge MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. 
Gobierno de Chile (2015a, November) Minute-by-minute: President Bachelet’s State Visit to 
the Philippines and her participation in the APEC Leaders’ Summit, as it happened. Retrieved 
from <http://www.gob.cl/2015/11/20/minute-by-minute-president-bachelets-state-visit-to-
the-philippines-and-her-participation-in-the-apec-leaders-summit-as-it-happened/> 
Gobierno de Chile (2015b, May) President Bachelet: “Chile is undergoing one of its most 
significant transformations ever”. Retrieved from 
<http://www.gob.cl/2015/05/21/president-bachelet-chile-is-undergoing-one-of-its-most-
significant-transformations-ever/> 
Gordon, B. (2012). Trading Up in Asia: Why the United States Needs the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership. Foreign Affairs, 91(4), 17-22. 
Harvey, D. (2005). A brief history of neoliberalism. Oxford [etc.]: Oxford University Press. 
Heron, T. (2008). Small states and the politics of multilateral trade liberalization. The Round 
Table, 97(395), 243-257. 
Herreros, S. (2011). The Trans-Pacific strategic economic partnership agreement: a Latin 
American perspective. ECLAC. 
Hsiang, A. C. (2014). TPP as Grand Strategy: Latin American Perspectives. In FLACSO-ISA Joint 
International Conference (July). 
Jarroud, M. (2014). Education Is the Key to Bachelet’s Chile. Interpress Service News Agency. 
Jenkins, R. (2012). Latin America and China—a new dependency? Third World Quarterly, 
33(7), 1337-1358. 
Khanna, T. and Y. Yafeh (2007) ‘Business groups in emerging markets: paragons or 
parasites?’ Journal of Economic Literature, 45 (2), 331–72, doi: 10.1257/jel.45.2.331. 
Katzenstein, P. J. (1985). Small states in world markets: Industrial policy in Europe. Cornell 
University Press. 
KEI (2011, March) The complete Feb 10, 2011 text of the US proposal for the TPP IPR 
chapter. Retrieved from <https://www.keionline.org/node/1091> 
43 
 
Keohane, R. O. (1969). Lilliputians' Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics. 
International organization, 23(02), 291-310. 
KNOEMA (2017, April) OECD Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Statistics. Retrieved from 
<https://knoema.com/OECDFDIS2014/oecd-foreign-direct-investment-fdi-
statistics?country=1000060-chile> 
Kubal, M. R., & Fisher, E. (2016). The Politics of Student Protest and Education Reform in 
Chile: Challenging the Neoliberal State. The Latin Americanist, 60(2), 217-242. 
Lara, J. C., & Ruiz, C. (2016). Acuerdos regionales de libre comercio y derechos humanos: el 
caso del TPP y su impacto en Chile. Anuario de Derechos Humanos, (12), 237-250. 
Libertad y Desarrollo (2013, November) Chile y la importancia del Transpacific Partnership 
(TPP). Retrieved from <http://lyd.org/centro-de-prensa/noticias/2013/11/chile-y-la-
importancia-del-transpacific-partnership-tpp/> 
Long, T. (2016). Small States, Great Power? Gaining Influence Through Intrinsic, Derivative, 
and Collective Power. International Studies Review, viw040. 
López, Ramón; Figueroa B., Eugenio; and Gutiérrez C., Pablo, 2013. “La ‘parte del león’: 
nuevas estimaciones de la participación de los súper ricos en el ingreso de Chile”. Serie 
Documentos de Trabajo (SDT) 379, Facultad de Economía y Negocios (FEN), Universidad de 
Chile. 
Moravcsik, A. (2008). The new liberalism. 
OEC (2015) Chile Atlas. Retrieved from 
<http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/chl/> 
Paley, J. (2015, August) Where the TPP could lose. Retrieved from <http://fpif.org/where-
the-tpp-could-lose/> 
Petri, P. A., & Plummer, M. G. (2016). The economic effects of the TPP: New 
estimates. Assessing the Trans-Pacific Partnership, 1, 16-1. 
Petri, P. A., Plummer, M. G., & Zhai, F. (2012). The Trans-pacific partnership and Asia-pacific 
integration: A quantitative Assessment (Vol. 98). Peterson Institute. 
Pulso (2013, August) Álvaro Jana: "Alrededor de un cuarto de los capítulos del TPP está 
cerrado". Retrieved from <http://www.pulso.cl/economia-dinero/alvaro-jana-alrededor-de-
un-cuarto-de-los-capitulos-del-tpp-esta-cerrado/> 
Radwin (2016, June) Students in Chile Are Demanding Free Tuition, and Protests Are Turning 
Violent. Retrieved from <https://news.vice.com/article/students-in-chile-are-demanding-
free-tuition-and-protests-are-turning-violent> 
44 
 
Robledo, M. (2013, June). Chile and the Asia Pacific: Toward a new foreign policy cycle. 
In Paper presentado en la Conferencia “Reaching Across the Pacific: Latin America and Asia 
in the New Century (Vol. 20). 
Rogowsky, R. A. (2015). Intellectual Property in the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Brown J. World 
Aff., 22, 123. 
Schott, J., Kotschwar, B., & Muir, J. (2014). Understanding the Trans-Pacific Partnership. 
Washington: Peterson Institute for International Economics. 
SICE OAS (2017) INFORMATION on CHILE. Foreign Trade Information System. Retrieved from 
<http://www.sice.oas.org/ctyindex/CHL/CHLagreements_e.asp> 
Sidenius, N. C. (1986). Peter J. Katzenstein: Small States in World Markets. Industrial Policy 
in Europe. Scandinavian Political Studies, 9(1), 86-91. 
Söderbaum, F. (2015). Rethinking Regionalism. New York: Palgrave MacMillan. 
Stallings, B. (2009). Chile: A pioneer in trade policy. In Competitive Regionalism(pp. 118-
138). Palgrave Macmillan UK 
Telesur (2015, October) The Trans-Pacific Partnership in Numbers. Retrieved from 
<http://www.telesurtv.net/english/multimedia/Infographic-The-TPP-in-Numbers-20151019-
0022.html>  
Telesur (2016, February) Chile argues TPP ‘Perfectly Compatible’ with China Trade Ties. 
Retrieved from <http://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/Chile-Argues-TPP-Perfectly-
Compatible-with-China-Trade-Ties-20160207-0028.html> 
Telesur (2017, April) Thousands of Chilean students take to streets demanding education 
reform. Retrieved from <http://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/Thousands-of-Chilean-
Students-Take-to-Streets-Demanding-Education-Reform-20170411-0022.html> 
The Economist (2015, February) Chile’s electoral system. Retrieved from 
<http://www.economist.com/blogs/americasview/2012/02/chiles-electoral-system> 
The Economist Intelligence Unit (2014a, March) Bachelet starts term with big intentions. 
Retrieved from 
<http://country.eiu.com.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2048/article.aspx?articleid=1741622958&Co
untry=Chile&topic=Politics#> 
The Economist Intelligence Unit (2014b, June) Seeking consensus on reforms. Retrieved from 
<http://country.eiu.com.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2048/article.aspx?articleid=571964841&Cou
ntry=Chile&topic=Politics> 
The Guardian (2010, January) Rightwinger Sebastián Piñera wins Chile presidency. Retrieved 
from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jan/18/sebastian-pinera-wins-chile-
presidency> 
45 
 
UNCTAD (2016) World Investment Report 2016. United Nations. 
Velasco, A. (2015, May) Will the TPP Help Latin America? Retrieved from 
<https://www8.gsb.columbia.edu/articles/chazen-global-insights/will-tpp-help-latin-
america> 
Velk, T., Gong, O., & Zuckerbrot, A. S. (2015). A Trans-Pacific Partnership. The Antitrust 
Bulletin, 60(1), 4-13. 
Waltz, K. N. (2010). Theory of international politics. Waveland Press. 
World Bank, World Bank Integrated Trade Solutions (2015), Chile GDP. Retrieved from 
<http://wits.worldbank.org/countrysnapshot/en/CHL> 
World Bank (2016). Global Economic Prospects, World Bank Group, Washington, DC. 
Yin, R. K. (2013). Case study research: Design and methods. Sage publications. 
